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Need-based Communication for Smart Grid: When
to Inquire Power Price?
Husheng Li and Robert C. Qiu
Abstract— In smart grid, a home appliance can adjust its
power consumption level according to the realtime power price
obtained from communication channels. Most studies on smart
grid do not consider the cost of communications which cannot
be ignored in many situations. Therefore, the total cost in smart
grid should be jointly optimized with the communication cost.
In this paper, a probabilistic mechanism of locational margin
price (LMP) is applied and a model for the stochastic evolution
of the underlying load which determines the power price is
proposed. Based on this framework of power price, the problem
of determining when to inquire the power price is formulated
as a Markov decision process and the corresponding elements,
namely the action space, system state and reward function, are
defined. Dynamic programming is then applied to obtain the
optimal strategy. A simpler myopic approach is proposed by
comparing the cost of communications and the penalty incurred
by using the old value of power price. Numerical results show
the significant performance gain of the optimal strategy of price
inquiry, as well as the near-optimality of the myopic approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smart grid [1] [6] [10] has attracted signif-
icant attention in the field of power systems, communications
and networking. In a smart grid, power is delivered from
power suppliers to home appliances with the aid of two-way
communications. The price of power changes with time, sub-
ject to many random factors like congestion level and power
generation. Home appliances can inquire the instantaneous
price and decide the consumption level of power. For example,
at midnight, the power load is usually low and thus the price
is relatively low; therefore, air conditioner may set a higher
temperature (suppose that it is in the winter) and enjoy the
low power price.
Existing studies usually pay attention to only the cost of
power consumption and ignore the cost of communications.
However, communications for inquiring the price in smart grid
could incur a nonnegligible cost. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider the cost of communications and study the optimal
policy of requesting communications for power price inquiry,
such that the total cost of power consumption and communi-
cations is minimized under certain constraints. To the authors’
best knowledge, no existing work has incorporated the cost of
communication into the decision procedure in smart grid.
Due to the cost of communication, it may not be optimal to
inquire the power price frequently. If the power price changes
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Fig. 1: The simplified model of smart grid.
slowly, it may be better to use old power price to optimize
the power consumption level. However, using old power price
is also risky. For example, when the old power price is much
higher than the current power price, the home appliance may
use a lower power consumption, thus wasting the opportunity
of low power price if it still uses the old price and does
not inquire the new one. When the old power price is much
lower than the current price, the policy of using old price
will result in a high power consumption level, thus incurring
significant penalty. Therefore, an optimal tradeoff should be
found between the cost of communications and the penalty
incurred by using the old value of power price.
In this paper, we study the decision problem of communica-
tion for inquiring the power price in order to minimize the total
cost. A key issue is the prediction of power price based on the
current obtained price. A model called probabilistic locational
marginal pricing (LMP) forecasting [4] [5] is applied to
predict the distribution of the power price at a given future
time. In this model, a curve is used to map from the true value
of power load to the power price. A probabilistic model similar
to Brownian motion is used to describe the distribution of load
as a functional of the elapsed time since the latest inquiry
of the power price. Once the evolution law of the power
price (load) is known, we convert the problem into a Markov
decision process (MDP) and obtain the corresponding state
transition probabilities. Then, we apply dynamic programming
to compute the optimal strategy. To simplify the strategy, we
also propose a myopic strategy which compares the cost of
communication with the penalty incurred by using the old
power price. Note that we assume that the dynamics of the
power price are perfectly known. For practical case, when
there is no perfect model for the power price, we can apply
the approach of reinforcement learning to learn the optimal
strategy, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model and the price forecasting are introduced in
Section II. The optimal communication policy is discussed
2in Section III. Numerical results are provided in Section IV
while conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND LMP FORECASTING
In this section, we first introduce the system model used in
this paper. Then, we give a brief introduction to the pricing
mechanism in the power grid, namely the LMP forecasting
mechanism.
A. System Model
Practical power grid is very complicated. To simplify the
analysis and facilitate the analytical discussion, we consider
a simple supplier-home model, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In this
model, we consider only one power supplier and one home
appliance. The power supplier provides power for the home
appliance via power line, as well as the power price via a
communication channel. The communication channel could be
over Internet, wireless networks or power line communication
systems. The home appliance inquires the power price via the
communication channel. The following assumptions are used
throughout the paper:
• We ignore possible errors over the communication chan-
nel and assume perfect communications. We do not
consider the details of communications like modulation
and coding.
• Time is divided into time slots. At the beginning of each
time slot, the power supplier adjusts its power price.
Then, the home appliance can inquire the power price and
receive the price information without or with delay. Once
the price is obtained, the home appliance determines its
power consumption level. These events are illustrated in
Fig. 2.
• For simplicity, we assume that the appliance can adjust
its power consumption according to the power price
immediately. In practice, there could be a delay for the
power consumption adjustment, e.g. it needs some time
to start the air conditioner. The corresponding analysis
will be more complicated and is beyond the scope of this
paper.
We denote by pt the power price and xt the power
consumption at the t-th time slot. The utility function of
the power consumption is denoted by U(xt), i.e. the home
receives reward U(xt) when the power consumption is xt. For
simplicity, we assume that the utility function does not change
with time. The cost for one communication effort is denoted
by c, which is assumed to be a constant. We denote by It the
event that the home inquires the power price at the t-th time
slot, i.e. It = 1 if it inquires and It = 0 otherwise. We denote
by τt the latest time slot before time slot t + 1 in which the
home inquired the power price. The home appliance uses the
same power price since the previous price inquiry, namely pτt
at time slot t. Therefore, the decision of power consumption is
based on the power price of the previous price inquiry, i.e. xt
is a function of pτt . For simplicity, we assume that the power
consumption level maximizes the net reward and ignores the
communication cost, i.e.
xt(p) = argmax
x
(U(x)− px) , (1)
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Fig. 2: Events within a time slot.
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Fig. 3: The dependency of factors in the supply chain.
where p is the price assumed by the home appliance (may be
different from the true value if the home appliance does not
inquire the power price). We assume that U is an increasing
and strictly concave function (thus the first order derivative is
strictly decreasing). We also assume that U is continuously
differentiable and its first order derivative, denoted by U˙
ranges from ∞ to 0. Therefore, the optimal value of the power
consumption level is given by
xt(p) = U˙
−1(p), (2)
which is derived from the first order condition, i.e.
U˙(x) − p = 0. (3)
Since U˙ ranges from ∞ to 0 and is continuous and strictly
decreasing, there exists a unique solution to (3). Hence, we
have a one-to-one mapping between the price and the optimal
power consumption level.
Although there are some simplifications in these quantities,
we can obtain the insight from the simplified model and extend
them to more generous case in the future. Based on the above
definitions, we assume that the total reward of the home
appliance is the discounted sum of the rewards in different
time slots, which is given by
R =
∞∑
t=0
βt (U(xt)− pτtxt − cIt) , (4)
where β is the discount factor.
B. LMP Forecasting
Power price is usually determined by LMP methodology,
which is actually driven by the time-varying load, as illustrated
in Fig. 3. The mapping between load and LMP is typically
obtained from a constrained optimization problem [9]. In
practice, the mapping can be represented by a piecewise curve,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. Therefore, the uncertainty of the power
price is from that of load. We notice that, in Fig. 4, the number
of possible prices is finite. Therefore, we denote by K the
total number of possible prices and by q1, q2, ..., qK the
corresponding prices. Meanwhile, we denote by J1, ..., JK
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Fig. 4: An illustration of the mapping between load and LMP.
the load intervals corresponding to the prices. Given a price
qi, we assume that the load is uniformly distributed within the
interval Ji.
Actually the load is a random variable. Typically, it is
modeled as a Gaussian random variable [4], i.e.
Dt ∼ N (µt, σ
2
t ), (5)
where Dt is the load at time slot t, µt and σt are the corre-
sponding expectation and variance. Note that the assumption
of Gaussian random variable is an approximation since a
Gaussian random variable could be negative while a negative
price is nonsense. To make it mathematically rigorous, we
modify the probability density function (PDF) of Dt as
f(Dt) =
exp
(
− (Dt−µt)
2
2σt
)
∫Dmax
0 exp
(
− (y−µt)
2
2σt
)
dy
, (6)
where Dmax is the maximal possible load.
To study the optimal inquiry time for communications, we
need to model the relationship between the time interval and
the Gaussian distribution parameters. Suppose that, at time slot
0, the true value of the load, D0, is known and then there is
no observation on the true value of the load. Then, we use the
following assumptions for the load distribution at time slot t:
• The expectation µt equals D0, i.e. the expectation does
not change with time, which represents an unbiased price
prediction.
• The variance σt equals σt = θt, i.e. the variance increases
linearly with the time gap, similarly to a Brownian
motion. The parameter θ can be estimated from historical
data. The rationale behind the Brownian motion like
variance is that Brownian motion is widely used to drive
the price fluctuation, e.g. stochastic differential equation,
in the area of financial analysis [8]. Therefore, we also
use a linearly increasing variance to model the increasing
uncertainty with time, which stimulates the price inquiry
over the communication channel.
III. OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRICE INQUIRY
In this section, we study the optimal policy for price inquiry
over the communication channel. We can model the decisions
L, 0 L, 1 L, 2 L, T
H, 0 H, 1 H, 2 H, T
...
...
Fig. 5: The diagram of state transition.
of price inquiry as a Markov decision process (MDP) [3]. We
will discuss the fundamental elements in the MDP. Then, we
apply the approach of value iteration to obtain the optimal
policy. Note that we assume that the statistical laws of the
price, like the mapping between the load and the price and the
uncertainty on the load, are all known to the home appliance.
A. MDP Modeling
There are three elements in a MDP problem, namely action
space, system state and reward. We discuss them in the context
of price inquiry separately.
1) Action: Obviously, the action of the home appliance is
the inquiry of the power price (denoted by 1) or not (denoted
by 0). The decision of action is determined by the current
system state and the policy of the home appliance. Actually,
there is an implicit action for the home appliance, i.e. the
power consumption level. In the most complicated case, the
power consumption level should also be a function of the
current system state and policy. However, to simplify the
analysis, we assume that the home appliance assumes the
power price of the latest inquiry, thus uniquely determines the
power consumption level. Therefore, we do not consider the
power consumption level as an action and do not incorporate
it into the decision policy.
We put an upper bound, denoted by T , for the number
of time slots between two price inquiries. Then, the home
appliance must send out a price inquiry within T time slots
since the previous price inquiry. The upper bound can address
the jeopardy brought by modeling imperfection, e.g. some
imprecise parameters may significantly lengthen the interval
between two inquiries to a harmful level, and thus improves
the robustness.
2) System State: The system state contains two parts,
namely the power price in the previous inquiry and the elapsed
time since the previous inquiry. For time slot t, the system state
is given by (pτt , t − τt). Obviously, if the home appliance
inquires the power price at time slot t, the corresponding
system state is (pt, 0). An illustration for the state transition
diagram is shown in Fig. 5 for the case of two possible
power prices (high or low). We notice that, whenever the price
substate is changed, the substate of elapsed time is reset to
0. Another important issue in the system state is the state
transition probability respect to the action. Obviously, if the
action is no inquiry, i.e. 0, the state is changed to (qi,∆+ 1)
if the previous state is (qi,∆). When the action is inquiry,
i.e. 1, the state is changed to (qj , 0) from the previous state
(qi,∆), where j is a random variable. We denote by Kij(∆)
4the probability of transiting from price qi to price qj after ∆
time slots. The transition probability is then given by
Kij(∆) = P (p∆ = qj |p0 = qi)
= P (D∆ ∈ Ij |p0 = qi)
=
∫
∞
0
P (D∆ ∈ Ij |D0, p0 = qi)dD0
=
1
|Ji|
∫
Ji
P (D∆ ∈ Ij |D0)dD0
=
1
|Ji|
∫
Ji
∫
Jj
f(D∆|D0)dD∆dD0, (7)
where |Ji| is the length of interval Jj and f(D∆|D0) is
the conditional PDF of D∆ given D0. From (6) and the
assumption on the expectation and variance, it is easy to verify
that the conditional PDF is given by
f(D∆|D0) =
exp
(
− (D∆−D0)
2
2∆θ
)
∫
∞
0
exp
(
− (y−D0)
2
2∆θ
)
dy
. (8)
3) Reward: Suppose that the system state of the previous
time slot is (qi,∆). If the action of the current time slot is
0, i.e. no inquiry, the expected reward of the current time slot
is given by (recall that the power consumption level x is a
function of the assumed price)
r(0) =
∑
j
Kij(∆)(U(x(qi))− qjx(qi)). (9)
Otherwise, the reward is given by (recalled that c is the cost
of communication)
r(1) =
∑
j
Kij(∆)(U(x(qj))− qjx(qj))− c. (10)
B. Value Iteration
Once defining the elements of MDP, we can apply Dynamic
Programming (DP) [3] to obtain the optimal strategy. We
denote by R(s) the optimal expected total reward when the
initial state is s. Then, R(s) satisfies the following Bellman’s
equation [2], which is given by
R(s) = max
a
(r(s, a) + βEs,a [R(s
′)]) , (11)
where r(s, a) is the expected reward due to action a and
system state s, Es,a is the expectation conditioned on a and
s, s′ is the system state in the next time slot. The expectation
can be computed using the state transition probability in (7).
The instantaneous reward r(s, a) can be computed using (9)
and (10).
The Bellman’s equation can be solved by using the follow-
ing value iteration [3], which is given by
R(t)(s) = max
a
(
r(s, a) + βEs,a
[
R(t−1)(s′)
])
, (12)
where the superscript t is the index of iteration. The iteration
converges to the solution of the Bellman’s equation as t→∞.
The optimal action is obtained from
a∗(s) = argmax
a
(r(s, a) + βEs,a [R(s
′)]) . (13)
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Fig. 6: The base case modified from the PJM five-bus system
[7].
C. Myopic Strategy
In the Bellman’s equation (11), the optimal action based
on the current system state should take the future reward
into account, thus making the solution complicated. A simpler
but perhaps suboptimal scheme is the myopic strategy, i.e.
optimizing the instantaneous reward r without considering the
future system state evolution. Then, the corresponding action
is given by
a =
{
0, if r(0) ≥ r(1)
1, if r(0) < r(1) , (14)
i.e. do not inquire the power price if the reward of no inquiry
is larger than that of inquiry, and vice versa. By applying the
expressions of rewards in (9) and (10), we have
a =
{
0, c ≥
∑
j Kij(∆)δrij
1, c <
∑
j Kij(∆)δrij
, (15)
where rij is defined as
δrij = U(x(qi)) − U(x(qj))− qj(x(qi)− x(qj)), (16)
which stands for the penalty of using the old value of the
power price. Then, the decision rule (15) means that, when
the cost of communication is larger than the penalty of using
the old power price instead of the new one, the action should
be no price inquiry; and the home appliance should inquire
the power price, otherwise.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use numerical simulations to explore the
optimal power price inquiry based on the above framework.
We use the PJM five-bus power system [7] for simulations,
whose configuration is illustrated in Fig. 6. The corresponding
curves of LMP versus load for the five buses are shown in Fig.
7 and the lower boundaries for the load intervals are given in
Table I (note that K = 7). Both the curves and the data are
obtained from the continuous LMP model in [5].
A. Optimal Communication Strategy
We assume that the upper bound of time slots between two
inquiries is 10 time slots. We set β = 0.99 for the discounted
sum of cost as the performance metric. The utility function of
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TABLE I: LMP ($/MWh) versus load (MW) [5]
Load (MW) LMP(A) LMP(B) LMP(C) LMP(D) LMP(E)
0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
600.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00
640.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
711.81 15.00 21.74 24.33 31.46 10.00
742.80 15.83 23.68 26.70 35.00 10.00
963.94 15.24 28.18 30.00 35.00 10.00
1137.02 16.98 26.38 30.00 39.94 10.00
1484.06 16.98 26.38 30.00 39.94 10.00
the home appliance is assumed to be U(x) = 100 logx. The
default values of θ and c are set to 200 and 10.
We first use the value iteration to obtain the optimal strategy
and the corresponding minimum discounted sum of cost. Note
that the cost here is defined as the gap of the corresponding re-
ward to the ideal reward when there is no communication cost.
We also tested the performance of the strategy of inquiring the
power price in every time slot. The ratios of the discounted
sum of cost obtained from the optimal strategy and that of
the always-inquiry strategy are then computed for different
values of θ and are shown in Fig. 8. There are five curves
since there are five buses in the simulated power system.
Obviously, the smaller the ratio is, the better the performance
gain of the optimal strategy of price inquiry is. We observe
that, for buses A, B and C, the ratio ranges between 0.6 and
0.8, i.e. the optimization can decrease the total cost by 20% to
40%. The performance gain of bus D is smaller. The reason
is that the price changes the most radically for bus D, thus
requiring more price inquiries. Since the power price of bus E
has only marginal changes with respect to the change of load,
it is much less necessary to inquire the price, thus making the
performance gain of bus E much more significant than other
buses.
Then, we compare the performance of the optimal strategy
with that of the no-inquiry strategy. The curves of cost ratios
are shown in Fig. 9. In sharp contrast to Fig. 8, the order
of the performance gain is reversed. The performance gain of
bus E is the least since the necessity of price inquiry is the
least for bus E. However, even for bus E, where the price
changes only marginally, the optimal strategy can still achieve
a very significant gain, thus demonstrating the necessity of
price inquiry in smart grid.
We repeated the simulations in Figures 8 and 9 for different
communication costs and fixed θ. From both figures, the
impacts of increasing communication cost on the performance
gain are contrary. As the communication cost increases, the
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Fig. 9: The ratio of cost between the optimal strategy and the
no-inquiry strategy with different θ.
home appliance should be more inclined not to inquire the
power price to reduce the cost of communication. Therefore,
the performance gain in Fig. 10 increases while that in Fig.
11 is decreased.
B. Myopic Strategy
In Figures 12 and 13, we compare the performance of
the optimal strategy and the myopic strategy with different
θ or different communication costs. In the ratio of cost,
the numerator is the cost of the optimal strategy while the
denominator is that of the myopic strategy. We observe that
the myopic strategy is very close to optimal. Therefore, in
practical systems, one may consider the myopic strategy due
to its simplicity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the communication cost in smart grid,
which is often omitted in existing studies. The dynamics
of power price have been modeled as a Markov chain by
modeling the random process of load as a Brownian motion
like one and employing the LMP-load mapping curve. Then,
the decision of power inquiry has been considered as a MDP
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problem and dynamic programming is employed to compute
the optimal strategy. To avoid the high computational cost, we
have studied a simple and suboptimal myopic strategy. A PJM
five-bus system has been used for numerical simulation, which
shows significant performance gain of the optimal strategy of
price inquiry, as well as the near-optimality of the myopic
approach.
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